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NEUMELER v. KUETINER: WHERE ARE THE
EMPEROR'S CLOTHES?
Aaron D. Twerski*

N

eumeier v. Kuehnerl is a case of exceptional importance. There
is every reason to expect that its impact on choice-of-law decisions throughout this country will be as telling and profound as
that of Babcock v. Jackson.2 Indeed it may turn out that Neumeier
will overtake Babcock as the seminal conflicts case. Babcock announced to the world the official demise of the First Restatement
and the rejection of rigid, broad-based choice-of-law rules. To replace it the court began charting a policy-centered or interest
analysis approach. Neumeier officially heralds the news that the most
sophisticated conflicts court in the nation has become somewhat
disenchanted with interest analysis. The court chose the occasion
of Neumeier to turn its back on pure interest analysis for very good
reason. The fact pattern in Neumeier when placed under the
scrutiny of interest analysis yielded no rational resolution to the
choice-of-law question. In fact, what was worse, it yielded no real
interests for the court to evaluate. It was simply an anathema to
the court to make the statement that it had before it a simple interstate accident case for which the host-guest policy of neither of the
two contact states was relevant." In this instance interest analysis
had gone bankrupt. It takes uncommon intellectual honesty to
state that "the emperor is wearing no clothes." Especially after
admiring the fine silk and splendid colors of the fabric, the investment in one's own pronouncements is usually too great for the
retraction to be made by its original protagonist. Yet, in Neumeier,
Chief Judge Fuld, the author of Babcock, explicitly questioned the
very foundations of interest analysis. 4 The reverberations will be
felt for a long time to come.
If Neumeier has declared open season on fanciful interest
analysis it must be admitted that it has also suggested to the courts
the desirability of formulating narrow choice-of-law rules. Having
questioned the adequacy of the interest analysis approach, the court
B.S., University of Wisconsin; J-D., Marquette University; Teaching Fellow,
Harvard Law School, 1966-67; Professor of Law, Hofstra University.
1. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
2. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2.d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).

3. See text accompanying notes 8 through 13 infra.
4. 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y..2d at 69.
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was forced to look around for a substitute framework to resolve
choice of law problems. The answer was to formulate rules. For
some academic commentators the mere idea of formulating a choiceof-law rule is abhorrent. 5 For others the thought of continuing on
with a methodological approach to choice-of-law without formulating rules is viewed as a drastic error.6 I think it is a fair statement
that the court in Neumeier rejected the first set of academic opinion
and adopted wholeheartedly the position of the "rulists." For this
writer it seems that the entire question has been misunderstood, and
the Fuldian choice-of-law rules bear out the state of confusion
existing in the art. If we are to have rules it would seem fair to
ask that there be some philosophical base underlying the rules. The
New York court has suggested that only two options are available:
(1.) ad hoc interest analysis and (2.) narrowly framed but rigid rules.
There is, however, another alternative. It just might be possible
to formulate "principled rules" that combine a fair degree of predictability and principled choice-of-law theory. 7 The Fuldian rules
for this author represent a potpourri of the worst aspects of pure
interest analysis and the rigidity of the First Restatement all tied
together in one package. Having no philosophical base they cannot
stand the test of time.
The task now before us is a rather formidable one. We must first
examine why the court rejected the classic teaching of interest
analysis in Neumeier. We then must turn our attention to the Fuld
rules and examine just how they will operate in actual practice.
Finally it will be necessary to read the signals the leading courts
have been giving us the past few years as to the direction they
wish to go in choice-of-law and attempt to formulate a principled,
predictive choice-of-law methodology based on the decisional path
they have been forging. The choice cannot be between ad hoc
decision-making and unprincipled rules. We cannot abandon this
most challenging area of the law to either the romanticists or the
technicians.
5. B. CuannE, NomES ON METHODS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE CONFuCt OF LAWS, in
SELEE
EssAYs ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAws 177-88 (1963); Baade, Counter-Revolution
or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, the Choice-of-Law Process,
46 TmAS L. REv. 141 (1967); Baade, judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36
BROOKLYN L. REv. 10 (1969). Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations are essentially "anti-rulist'; see R. LErs.R, AMEmIcAN CONFuCTs LAw § 105 (1968).
6. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CoRHmL L Rev. 315 (1972) and
Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.LA. L REv. 551, 641 (1968).
7. See, e.g., CAvERs, THE CHoicE-OF-1AW PRocss 139-203 (1964).
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I.

ZERO-INTEREST ANALYSIS: THE UNPROVIDED FOR CASE

A.

The Illogic of the Unprovided For Case

Neumeier presented the New York Court of Appeals for the
first time with a choice-of-law case in which, under traditional
analysis, neither of the contact states had a legitimate governmental
interest. How did this strange result come to pass? It was very simple
indeed. In Neumeier the defendant was a New York resident who
travelled from Buffalo, New York to Ontario, Canada. In Fort Erie,
Ontario, he picked up his guest, Neumeier, an Ontario resident.
Their trip was to take them to Long Beach, also in Ontario, and
back again to Neumeier's home in Fort Erie. On the way to Long
Beach, at a railroad crossing, the defendant Kuehner's car was struck
by a train. Both the host and his guest passenger were killed in the
collision.
This simple fact pattern, superimposed on the legal positions
of New York and Ontario as to host-guest liability, was destined to
produce an anomalous situation. New York, as we all know, has
no host-guest statute. Ontario, on the other hand, requires a guest
to prove gross negligence against his host in order to recover.8
Under interest analysis in order to determine whether there is a

true policy conflict one must examine the policies supporting the
supposedly conflicting rules. Traditional analysis would lead a court
to conclude that New York's policy favoring compensation is not
relevant since New York is primarily concerned with the welfare
of its domiciliaries. Since the plaintiff is an Ontario domiciliary
New York really has no stake or interest as to whether the plaintiff
recovers. Conversely, the Ontario host-guest statute has no necessary
claim to application. Numerous rationales have been offered for hostguest statutes. Whether the reason be that they were designed to

protect insurance companies from host-guest collusion or to protect
hosts from ungrateful guests it is clear that Ontario has no strong
reason to opt for the operation of the host-guest statute in this
instance. The defendant is a New Yorker and if the policies of
Ontario's host-guest statute are to protect Ontario domiciliaries or
insurance companies doing business in Ontario, then Ontario could
care little if compensation were offered off the back of a New York
defendant. The late Professor Brainerd Currie, when faced with this
kind of dilemma, was quite direct as to its implication. He said:
8. Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario [ONT. REV.

STAT.

ch. 172 (1960)],

§ 105(2), as amended, Stat. of 1966, ch. 64, § 20(2). The statute provides that the guest
passenger cannot recover unless the host was guilty of gross negligence.
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"This is the 'unprovided for case' in a very special sense. Neither
state cares what happens." Realizing that this statement was somewhat shocking, Gurrie went on to defend this position: 10
It may be that the laws of neither state, nor of both states
together, purport to dispose of the entire universe of possible
cases. Identical laws do not necessarily mean identical
policies, and different laws do not necessarily mean conflicting
policies, when it is remembered that the scope of policy is
limited by the legitimate interests of the respective states.
The net result of all this is that the methodology of interest
analysis tells the court that it has before it a simple interstate auto
accident case for which neither state has any relevant policy. When
Currie said that "traditionalists may stand aghast at this anomaly"'"
he understated the reaction considerably. Is it really possible for
rational people to conclude that neither New York nor Ontario
has any concern with the outcome of this commonplace accident
phenomenon? 12 It defies belief. Only the almost mesmerizing effect
of the brilliant Gurrie writing prevented this statement from being
subjected to the strongest ridicule.
Why is it that interest analysis met its Waterloo with the advent
of the unprovided for case? The answer as this author sees it is
rather elementary. In evaluating interests Currie and his academic
followers placed tremendous emphasis on the interest of the domicile state of the partiesin grantingor denying recovery. For example,
whenever plaintiff hailed from a state granting recovery and defendant was domiciled in a state denying recovery the interest analysts
claimed that there was an irreconcilable conflict. After all doesn't
the domicile state of one party want him to recover and the domicile
state of the other party seek to deny recovery? There was rarely any
attempt to view the policies behind these rules in broader perspective.
They either protected a domiciliary interest or did not. 13 It was as
simple as all that.
9. B. CURRiE, SURViVAL OF ACtiONs: ADJUDICATION VERsus AUTOMATION IN THE CON-

FLicr OF LAws, in SELErrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICr oF LAws 152 (1963). Professor Baade
has called this phenomenon the "no policy" case or "the case where a sensible result
could only be obtained by altruistic interest analysis." Baade, Judge Keating and the
Conflict of Laws, 36 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 10, 30 (1969).
10. B. Currie, supra note 9, at 153.
11. Id. at 152.
12. Professor B. Currie seeks to ameliorate the fears of the traditionalists by adverting
to the fact that under traditional First Restatement analysis such a result is possible.
See id. at 153 n.80. See also Cavers, supra note 7, at 39 and 47, for further comments
by Professor Currie on the unprovided for case.
13. Recognition was, of course, given to admonitory policies of states designed to
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In an unprovided for case like Neumeier we face a situation where
there are no domiciliary interests to protect on the part of the contact states. New York has no domiciliary interests to protect by its
pro-compensation rule since the plaintiff is not a New Yorker. Ontario has no domiciliary interests to protect by its anti-compensation
rule because the defendant is not an Ontario domiciliary. Thus, the
entire structure of interest analysis crumbled. Having defined the
interests as domiciliary oriented when you run out of domiciliaries
to protect you run out of interests.' 4 The emperor indeed stands
naked for all to see.
encourage or discourage certain kinds of activity. But when dealing with negligence
concepts these policies are given short shrift. WEiNTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON TIM CON-

Fucr oF LAws 219-20 (1971). Clearly when the issue goes to the measure of recovery
there is a heavy tendency to view this issue as domiciliary oriented. Professor Cavers
has taken a far different view of compensatory policies. Cavers, supra note 7, at 144.
1 14. It is interesting to note the marked difference in the discussion of this problem
between the pure interest analysts and Professor David Cavers who has tempered his
analysis with considerations other than the standard compensation and anti-compensation interests. See Cavers, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.LA. L. Rnv. 551, 647,
652 (1968). For Professor Currie the resolution of the unprovided for case depended on
the willingness of the pro-compensation court to discover an altruistic purpose in its
statute. In responding to a Cavers hypothetical Professor Currie argued for giving the
benefit of the New York rule of unlimited recovery for wrongful death to a Massachusetts plaintiff, despite that state's ceiling on recovery. The plaintiff's husband had been
killed by the negligence of the New York defendant's servant in Massachusetts.
Professor Currie, writing in the role of Judge to decide the Cavers' hypothetical,
remarked as follows:
It would be possible, of course, for New York's courts to hold that the policy
of compensation without arbitrary limitation is designed primarily for New
York people, and to classify nonresidents on the basis of the laws of their home
states in order to deny them the protection of New York law when it is withheld from them by their own law. I would not make such classifications arbitrarily, however. In some situations-for example in the case in which domestic
law protects married women from liability for the debts of their husbandsI would be quick to classify and to deny the nonresident married woman a protection, or a disability, not bestowed or imposed by her home state. In other
cases-concerning, for example, debtors' exemptions-I should much prefer the
principle of equal treatment for all. (See Currie, 'Selected Essays on the Confict of Laws,' 545-57 (1963).)
Here, since New York will apply its law to give full compensation to the
survivors of the New York citizen killed in Massachusetts, I would apply the
principle of equality and do the same for the survivors of the deceased citizen
of Massachusetts. I find comfort in the fact that the New York defendant's liability insurance will cover it in both cases; in the arrangement of such insurance
there is no way to predict whether the victim will be a citizen of New York or
of Massachusetts.
Of course I am here venturing to define the scope of New York's policy,
which is essentially a task for the legislature. If I am wrong I invite the legislature to correct our decision should I lead my brethren into error as well. But
if New York's policy is to be narrowly and selfishly defined in this situation, out
of consideration for those local interests that would benefit from such a definition,
the decision should be made by the legislature, which is the proper institution
to respond to the pressures from local private interests-not by this court, in
which sensitivity to such pressures would be, to say the least, unbecoming.
Currie, in Cavers, supra note 7, at 4748.
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Before turning to the Neumeier opinion to examine how the
court dealt with this serious theoretical flaw I shall turn briefly to
some recent academic opinion of the interest analysts. The unprovided for case presented a considerable challenge to them. Unless
they were ready to stand with Currie and admit that in a simple interstate auto accident there was no law which had a claim to application
some ploy had to be found to rescue the situation. Salvation was discovered in the "common policy" doctrine. 15 It hypothecates a common policy of all states in providing compensation to the victims of
auto accidents at the hands of negligent drivers. Host-guest statutes are viewed as limited exceptions to the normal compensatory
policy. Thus, in a case like Neumeier both New York and Ontario
are viewed as having a common policy of compensating plaintiffs for
ordinary negligence. Ontario, however, has an exception to this
policy for the purpose of protecting Ontario insurers or Ontario
domiciliaries. Since the defendant is a New York defendant and the
insurer has insured the defendant in New York the Ontario exception is not applicable; ergo, the common policy of compensation surfaces and controls the outcome of the case.
For all the ingenuity that this approach offers it suffers the same
basic flaw discussed earlier. If indeed there is an underlying policy
which favors the compensation of plaintiffs for injuries done them
by negligent defendants, it must be admitted that in the case of hostguest, New York and Ontario have parted ways. The common policy
has changed to diversity with regard to whether a guest should be
able to recover from a host for ordinary negligence.'0 In order to
It is clear that using Professor Currie's approach New York would be deciding the
level of its altruism. Where does the New York court receive counsel as to how to
make the decision as to how altruistic it is to be? Furthermore, where else in the law
do we decide cases based on a given level of altruism? The tendency to inject into
conflicts jurisprudence factors and concepts foreign to any other area of the law has
been the subject of extensive discussion by this author. See Twerski, To Where Does
(1973).
One Attach the Horses, 61 Ky. L.J. Interestingly enough, the altruism theme was apparently a Currie afterthought.
In his earlier discussions on the unprovided for case he suggested four alternative solutions to this problem. Currie, supra note 9, at 153. This bears out my argument that
these kinds of interests are often pulled out of the hat to fit the particular occasion.
15. Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on
Torts,57 IowA L. REv. 1219, 1229 (1972); Weintraub, supra note 13, at 284; see also Sedler,
Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, this volume. In response to a challenge that he had not adequately solved the
unprovided for case, Professor Weintraub analyzed this strange phenomenon in Weintraub, Response to the Critiques of Professors Sedler, Twershi, and Walker, 57 IowA
L. REv. 1219, 1258, 1260-61 (1972). But it appears that as a true interester he is willing
to recognize that there may indeed be cases where no state has any policy preference.
16. For an analysis of the common policy approach in contract choice of law, see
Twerski, Choice.of-Law in Contracts-Some Thoughts on the Weintraub Approach,
57 IowA L. Ray. 1219, 1239 (1972).
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remove this host-guest exception from the picture one must argue
that the purpose of the host-guest statute is to protect Ontario
domiciliaries or Ontario insurers only. This approach is fraught
with problems. It is premised on the belief that host-guest statutes
are domiciliary oriented: that they are designed to protect only some
persons or class of persons of Ontario origin. The domiciliary bias
discussed earlier has returned to haunt us. It may be that there exist
rules of law that are clearly designed to protect domiciliaries but by
and large this entire approach to interpretation of both statutory
and common law policy is naive and simplistic. Perhaps it is true
that Ontario passes statutes primarily for the protection of Ontario
domiciliaries but it does so because it believes that justice will best
be furthered by the implementation of its host-guest policy. Thus,
for example, even if the purpose of the host-guest rule was to protect
against insurance collusion, Ontario is taking a strong position on
the phenomenon of insurance fraud. Gould not Ontario also be
legitimately concerned that its plaintiffs not be given the opportunity to be defrauders? It hardly seems legitimate to read the interests
in the narrow sense which the interest analysts advocate.
The great flaw, however, lies in the belief that rules of law are
domicile oriented. There is a tendency to look at the major motivational factor1 7 which may have pushed a legislature or court to adopt
a certain policy and equate that with the policy of the statute or
common law rule itself. The two, of course, are not the same. Thus,
it may well be that, absent the desire to protect Ontario domiciled
insurance companies, host-guest statutes would not have been passed.
But, once the statute is in force, the ramifications of its existence may
far surpass the primary motivational factor. The statute in actual
operation becomes a strong moralizing statement to the populace of
Ontario, and indeed perhaps to all those who pass through Ontario,
that Ontario views insurance collusion with great distaste and that
as a state it reacts negatively to the possibility of its occurrence. This
statement can legitimately be made by Ontario to its plaintiffs, dedefendants or visitors involved in auto accidents in Ontario. It is legitimately debatable how far and to which persons Ontario should address itself (that is the choice of law question); but its interests
can be and undoubtedly are directed to more than its domiciliaries.
The problem of pinning down statutory purpose to determine
17. Judge Breitel, in his concurring opinion in Neumeler, referred to the method
of the late Brainerd Currie as being "deeply engaged in probing the psychological
motivation of legislatures of other states in enacting statutes restricting recoveries In
tort cases." 31 N.Y.2d at 131, 286 N.E.2d at 459, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
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the true governmental interest has another troubling aspect to it
which is very well demonstrated by the development of host-guest
statutes.' 8 Assume for the moment that it could be conclusively
proved that the primary motivation for passing host-guest statutes
was to protect insurance companies. How would an Ontario court
deal with a purely domestic host-guest case where the defendant was
an uninsured motorist? Or, as in the facts of Neumeier where suit
was being conducted by the representatives of the two estates, since
both parties were killed in the crash, how is it that in a pure domestic setting host-guest applies? In both of the above instances the collusion purpose vanishes. Yet, for better or worse, host-guest applies.
Perhaps the courts and legislatures were unwise in extending the
application of the policy to an area where it does not serve its primary purpose. There has indeed been heavy scholarly criticism that
the patchwork of exceptions that has been engrafted onto the hostguest statutes does not further the statutory purpose of preventing
collusion against insurance companies. 19 Be that as it may the facts
are that a complex decisional network of cases exists in the host-guest
area. If at the domestic level it becomes impossible to reconcile
the case law or indeed the statute itself with the supposed statutory
purpose how do the "interesters" propose to accomplish this feat
in the context of an interstate conflicts case? It is impossible to impose a simplistic interest analysis on any common law policy or any
fully interpreted statutory scheme. The jurisprudential insights of
the interest analysts were valuable. But, they oversold their product.
When the hard cases began to roll in, the courts became aware that
it was not what it was cracked up to be. Little wonder that the court
20
in Neumeier said:
18. Professor Rosenberg's strong statement on this topic remains to this day unrebutted by the interest analysts. In commenting on Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div.2d
595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dept. 1966), he said:
Searching for governmental interests presupposes that the purposes behind
substantive rules are so clear, so singular, so univocal that we can hope to discover them with some certainty and some consensus. This is at odds with reality.
Even the simple rules that raise rights and duties with regard to personal
injuries are a composite of thrusts and counter-thrusts of many kinds. For
instance there are many substantive rules favoring recovery for negligent
injuries; but contributory negligence, assumption of risk, workmen's compensation exclusions and other rules are opposed to recovery. To try to bring all
the huffing and puffing together into a policy that runs dearly in one direction
and that has a measurable intensity that permits comparing it with some contrary policy is, in my judgment, pure fantasy.
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, An Opinion for the New York Court
of Appeals, 67 COLUmn. L. REv. 459, 464 (1967).
19. See, e.g., Comment, judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
884 (1968); PROSSER, THE LAw oF TORTS (4th ed,) at 186 (1971).
20. 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.YS.2d at 69.
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[I]t is frequently difficult to discover the purposes or policies underlying the relevant local law rules of the respective
jurisdictions involved. It is even more difficult, assuming that
these purposes or policies are found to conflict, to determine
on some principled basis which should be given effect at the
expense of others.
B.

Testing the Neumeier Analysis

Neumeier is a difficult case to read. Although conflicts literature
had identified the Neumeier type case as the "unprovided for case" 21
the court did not clearly acknowledge that Neumeier fit this category. In fact, the court did something very curious. After stating
with great clarity that New York had no interest in applying its
compensatory policy, since the plaintiff was not a New Yorker, it
intimated that by applying Ontario law it was fulfilling an Ontario
interest by denying the plaintiff recovery under the Ontario act. The
22
court stated:
It is clear that, although New York has a deep interest in
protecting its own residents, injured in a foreign state,
against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that state, it has
no legitimate interest in ignoring the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction-such as Ontario-and in protecting the
plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation
obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in
a vehicle traveling within its borders (emphasis added).
If the court was correct on its interest analysis the decision should
have closed with the above-stated quote. If New York had no interest and Ontario had an interest, then the case was a false conflict and
should have posed no serious problem to a court so well-schooled in
conflicts law. Why then did the court go on to express its dissatisfaction with its ability to discover and evaluate interests? Others may
take the position that the court was seeking to get to the rule-making
stage of the case so that the Fuld rules could finally be set in type
in a majority opinion. I should like to take a less cynical view and
applaud the court's methodology. To understand why the court
was unwilling to decide the case solely on the basis of the Ontario
interest, it will be helpful to take a close look at another landmark
New York case: IntercontinentalPlanning Co. v. Daystrom, Inc. 28
21. See Currie, supra note 9.
22. 31 N.Y.2d at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
23. 24 N.Y.2d 872, 248 N.E.2d 576, 800 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
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Although Neumeier is the first clear case which falls in the unprovided for category, it is arguable that Daystrom was just such a
case. The court in Daystrom was faced with the question of whether
to apply the New York Statute of Frauds-which requires brokerage
contracts to be in writing-against a New York plaintiff. The defendant was a New Jersey corporation which could not seek the protection of New Jersey law since the New Jersey Statute of Frauds
did not require brokerage contracts to be in writing. Is this not the
unprovided for case?24 The state willing to enforce the contract
has no compelling reason to do so since plaintiff is not a domiciliary of New Jersey. New York, the domicile of the plaintiff-broker,
might have an interest in enforcing the contract but its statute requires the contract to be in writing and would thus deny enforcement. Thus, neither state had any compelling interest either to enforce or not enforce the contract. If anything, an argument could
be made that both states have a subsidiary goal of enforcing contracts
and that New York's exception to that goal is not applicable since
the defendant is not a New York domiciliary.
The New York Court of Appeals did not follow traditional analysis in Daystrom. The court reasoned that New York had an interest in attracting business to the state since it is the commercial
center of the United States. As such, it wanted businessmen to know
that New York does not enforce oral brokerage contracts. This tour
de force was completed by finding that New Jersey had no opposing
interest if New York would give protection to New Jersey corporations against New York plaintiffs. This kind of interest manipulation is highly questionable. If there is to be no limit to the imagination which courts can bring to bear on interest analysis then perhaps
Daystrom is acceptable. Are we to believe that the New York Court
of Appeals got caught up in fanciful unrealistic reasoning? I think
not. The facts in Daystrom drove the court to a common sense
result that had little to do with interest analysis. If one views the
facts in Daystrom with any sense of objectivity it is clear that the
"center of gravity" of the contract was truly New York. The contract
was almost entirely negotiated in New York. The court viewed the
24. Professor Cavers has taken the position that certain laws are not domiciliary
oriented (i.e., designed to protect persons) but rather are directed toward governing
transactions. He then concludes that territorial considerations are important in deciding
a statute of frauds case like Daystrom. Cavers, The Value of PrincipledPreferences, 49
TEAs L. REv. 211, 222 (1971). The ensuing analysis is considerably to the right of
Professor Cavers. To the degree that Professor Cavers seeks support in the New York
statute of frauds, for the court's territorial thinking, this author is in substantial disagreement. The territorial thinking of the court dominated the discussion. The
statutory purpose was, in my opinion, totally contrived.
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contract as a "New York contract." The court detailed at great
length the heavy territorial involvement of New York in this contractual agreement. 25 Let it be noted that we are not now focusing
on any single event, such as the place of signing or other isolated
event, but a broad range of contacts over a prolonged period of
time centering in and around New York.
The court then found itself in a predicament. True, all these
territorial contacts centered around New York; but contacts and a
continued course of action are not interests within the methodology
of interest analysis. Under traditional analysis only the interests
of New York domiciliaries were protected by the New York Statute
of Frauds and there was no New York domiciliary in need of
protection. Instead of recognizing that the territorial dimensions
of the case had become predominant and governed the case, the
New York court decided to manipulate the interests. The judges
sat back and conjured up a deterrent interest-to prevent businessmen who come to New York from entering into oral brokerage contracts even when their home states would enforce such contracts
against them. This juggling of interests in order to provide for a
sound territorial result is something that the New York court had
done prior to Daystrom. It cannot in the long run hold up as satisfactory methodology.
All this is by way of introduction to the Neumeier analysis. The
court in Neumeier, as pointed out earlier, began its analysis by
negating New York's interest and affirming that Ontario had a
legitimate interest in applying its law to deny recovery to an Ontario guest who took a ride in Ontario. Chief Judge Fuld did not
elaborate on what was the true nature of that Ontario interest. At
one point he alluded to the "ungrateful guest" 2 concept as one of
25. The court listed the territorial contacts in the following manner:
It is dear that the instant dispute has sufficient contacts with New York to
give our State a substantial interest in applying its policy. Plaintiff is a New
York corporation and its international finder's business centers in this State.
Moreover, plaintiff's representation of Rochar derived from a New York meeting
with Rochar's president. Plaintiff solicited Daystrom's interest in Rochar through
an advertisement placed in a New York newspaper, and Mr. Jakob introduced
the presidents of the two original principals (Rochar and Daystrom) at a meeting
in a New York restaurant. At this New York meeting the principals agreed to
compensate plaintiff with a finder's fee if a business relationship was concluded
between Rochar and Daystrom. The remaining contacts leading up to the execution of the written finder's fee agreement involve letters and telephone calls
emanating from plaintiff's New York office and the New Jersey office of Daystrom.
It is therefore clear that the services for which plaintiff claims compensation
were substantially rendered in New York, and that our State has a substantial
relationship with the formation and negotiation of the finder's fee agreement.
24 N.Y.2d at 384, 248 N.E.2d at 583, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
26. 31 N.Y.2d at 124, 286 N.E.2d at 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
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the prime purposes of the statute. To the degree that Ontario believes that ungrateful guests should not bring suit for ordinary negligence there is every reason for Ontario to have an interest in Ontario
"ungrateful guests" being denied the right to sue. Had the court
stopped at this point it would have reaffirmed the domiciliary-ori"
ented approach to interest analysis. It would have done so by juggling interests to accomplish a result which it believed to be fair
and just. Yet, the methodology would not have reflected the true
reason behind the decision. The decision would have been Daystrom
revisited.
Happily, the court took a different and more honest route to its
decision. The court first looked at the interests and found that this
was a case where interest analysis could provide precious little in the
way of guidance. The court then went on to state rather clearly that
it could not see how it could rationally refuse to apply Ontario law
to an Ontario guest for an accident taking place in Ontario.2 7 The
court frankly acknowledged a territorialist bias. Having advocated
a territorialist orientation to choice-of-law, Neumeier in a sense bore
out my prediction that courts would soon tire of simplistic interest
analysis and would begin paying attention to the territorial dimensions of fact-patterns coming before them.28 Although much of this
happened in Neumeier it happened in a peculiar fashion. The court
did recognize the severe limitation of interest analysis and did express territorial leanings. Alas, the method for accomplishing the
recognition of territorialism were the Fuld rules. It is at this point
that I must part company with the court. With all due deference to
Chief Judge Fuld's rules, they are neither fish nor fowl; they pay
allegiance to two systems-interest analysis and lex loci delicti. And
it is here that I throw up my hands in despair because I can make no
principled sense out of choice-of-law methodology-New York style.
II. TIH

HOST-GUEST

RuLEs: THE

NATURAL LAW OF THE TRIBAL

COMMUNITY

The rules proposed by Chief Judge Fuld provide as follows:2 9
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the
27. The court stated that it was applying Ontario law which was "obviously
addressed... to a resident riding in a vehide traveling within its borders." 31 N.Y.2d
at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68. There was, of course, nothing obvious
about the result under interest analysis. The result is only obvious under a territorial
analysis.
28. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania
Method, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 347, 373 (1971).
29. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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law of that state should control and determine the standard
of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that
conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact
that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law
of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the
guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law
permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state
should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver
are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less
categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be
that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can
be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will
advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
The court throughout the Neumeier opinion was terribly
troubled by Tooker v. Lopez.80 It will be recalled that the tragic
events of that case arose entirely in the state of Michigan. Plaintiff's
and defendant's deceased daughters, both New York residents, were
co-eds attending Michigan State University. They and a third fellow
student, Miss Susan Silk, who was a Michigan resident, embarked on
a local Michigan trip which ended in the death of the two New
Yorkers. The students were all in residence at the University and the
trip was "intrinsically and exclusively a Michigan trip, concerned
only with Michigan places, roads and conditions." The choice-oflaw problem arose because New York has no host-guest rule and
Michigan denies recovery in host-guest cases in the absence of "gross
negligence or willful misconduct" on the part of the defendant. The
court in Tooker found that there was a false conflict in a case between a New York plaintiff versus a New York defendant. Michigan had no interest in applying its law denying recovery when
the defendant was a New Yorker.
Following Tooker reasoning and pure interest analysis, Neumeier must be recognized as an unprovided for case. If Michigan has
no interest in applying its host-guest rule when the defendant is a
New Yorker why, pray, should Ontario have an interest in applying
80. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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its host-guest rule when the defendant is a New Yorker? The only
out is to fall back on the Neumeier argument that Ontario had an
interest in applying its host-guest rule against an Ontario plaintiff.
But, as we noted earlier, the court never explicitly cited that as an
interest. Furthermore, the court in Neumeier expressed harsh judgment on its ability to identify and evaluate interests. Finally, if we
determine that Ontario has an interest in applying its law against
an Ontario plaintiff it is hard to justify a rationale that would cut
out an Ontario plaintiff and not address itself to an out-of-state
plaintiff as well. The denial of recovery does not arise from a desire
to deprive plaintiff of recovery but rather from a strong dislike of
insurance fraud. As Professor Rosenberg has astutely pointed out,
that interest is a "moralizing" one that could address itself to all
accidents arising within Ontario. 81
It is difficult to find a way out of the dilemma. If the interests as
set forth in Tooker are to be taken seriously then Neumeier was
incorrectly decided. If Neumeier is correct in saying that one must
take the interests with a rather heavy dose of salt and pay attention
to the territorial contacts and relationships, then Tooker was incorrectly decided. It is no answer that in Tooker there was a common
domicile and in Neumeier the domiciles of the parties were disparate. The domicile factor is important for one of two reasons: (1)
the parties' domicile creates an interest or (2) it denotes a relationship between the parties in the domicile state. Neumeier put to rest
the idea that it is inappropriate to give a non-domiciliary defendant
the benefit of a protective law which he would not have in his own
home state. Thus even where the defendant's domicile does not protect him he may be protected by the law of the state of injury. Very
simply, under pure interest analysis it is the defendant's domicile
as his protector which creates the interest-not the common nature
of the domicile between defendant and plaintiff. The relationship
between plaintiff and defendant could be important to a court which
placed heavy emphasis on territorial contacts but the court in
Tooker eschewed that approach. There is one ace in the hole. New
York will disregard both conflicting interests and territorial contacts
that are heavily weighted against New York in every situation in
which New York has a compensatory interest. This approach would
reconcile both Tooker and Neumeier, since in Tooker the plaintiff
was a New Yorker and in Neumeier the plaintiff was from Ontario.
31. See Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 463. Professor Rosenberg addressed himself to

the anti-ingrate purpose. The same analysis could be made for the insurance collusion
interest as well.
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The explanation is engaging but will not hold up under scrutiny.
Chief Judge Fuld's second rule provides rather clearly that New
York will not protect a member of its tribe at all costs. Where defendant is driving in his home state he will be protected from a New
York plaintiff's claim if the defendant's home state gives him the
protection of host-guest. To defend that result one must be prepared
to take the position that where the conduct and domicile of the defendant coincide in his home state, that law applies. But if one is
about to destroy a New York interest on the grounds that a defendant acted within a territorial framework from which legitimate
expectancies arose then I suggest that Tooker makes no sense. The
territorial framework was every bit as clear in Tooker. If there were
a right to expectancies from the territorial contacts then they were
such that Michigan law would apply.
The purpose of the above analysis is not to suggest that the Fuld
rules are logically inconsistent. One can put together the technology
without doing violence to Aristotelian logic. There is, however, a
need to project a general philosophical position which emphasizes
priorities in choice-of-law. The Fuld rules suffer from a basic inconsistency at this level. The first rule projecting common domicile as
the controlling factor puts down territorial considerations completely. This is consistent only with pure interest analysis of the
Currie variety. The second and third rules emphasize territorialism
with the vengeance of the First Restatement by applying the lex loci
delicti even in the face of strong opposing interests.
The criticism of the Fuld rules as partaking of First Restatement
philosophy is not lightly made. A recent Kentucky conflicts case,
Foster v. Leggett,8 2 demonstrates the rigidity of these rules quite
dramatically. Foster was a host-guest case involving John Leggett
and Helen Stringer, close friends who had been dating for a long
time. They were both divorced and both worked for several years
in the same office for the CGO Railroad in Russell, Kentucky. Helen
Stringer lived in Kentucky all her life. John Leggett on the other
hand split his allegiance between Kentucky and Ohio. He made his
home and technical domicile in Portsmouth, Ohio. But his connections with Kentucky were strong. Not only did he work in Kentucky
but he rented a room in Russell, Kentucky, at the YMCA and would
stay there anywhere from two to five nights a week. The day before
the fatal accident John and Helen got together for a game of golf.
At that time they planned for the morrow a day in the big city,
32. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
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Columbus, Ohio, some 100 miles north of both Russell, Kentucky, and
Portsmouth, Ohio. In order to get an early start the next day, John
spent the night in his room at the YMCA. The next morning he
picked up Helen at her home and they proceeded on U.S. Highway
No. 23 to Columbus. They had planned that John would transact
some business and Helen would do some shopping. They would
then get together for dinner, go to the show or the races, and then
return to Russell the night of the same day. On the way John attempted to pass another car. It was raining and the roads were wet.
In the process of passing, John lost control of the car, crossed the
median and collided with a south-bound vehicle on the highway.
Helen Stringer was killed in the collision.
In a suit brought by Carole Foster as administratrix for the estate
of Helen Stringer the problem faced by plaintiff was that under the
law of Ohio, the locus of the accident, she could not recover. The
defendant, Leggett, was guilty at most of ordinary negligence. Under
the Ohio host-guest statute there could be no recovery by the guest
against the host unless plaintiff could prove that the defendant was
guilty of wanton and willful misconduct. 33 The Kentucky rule sets
up no such obstacle-ordinary negligence will suffice. The Kentucky
court applied Kentucky law permitting the plaintiff recovery against
the Ohio defendant with proof of ordinary negligence being held
sufficient.
In a recent symposium discussion of Foster, Professor Willis
Reese, a strong supporter of Chief Judge Fuld's rules, indicated that
Fosterwould have been decided the other way had Kentucky adopted
the proposed rules. 34 Rule Two provides: 35
When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that
liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of
the state of the victim's domicile.
At first blush this rule seems eminently just and fair. One ought not
to be held liable while acting within his home state merely because
a plaintiff from another state has intruded on the defendant's domain.3 6 This rule envisaged a situation which was highly territorial
and when such a situation arises the result reached by the rule is
33.
34.
25.
36.

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (1965).
(1973).
Reese, Comments on Fosterv. Leggett, 61 KY. L.J. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
See Twerski, supra note 28.
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fair. But Foster is not a case which is territorially dominated by
Ohio. The plaintiff in Foster did not come to Ohio to be driven
around the block by the defendant in his home town. The contrary
is true. The defendant in Foster came to Kentucky and took the
plaintiff on a trip that was to begin in Kentucky and was to end in
Kentucky. The defendant himself was highly Kentucky-oriented
in that he both worked and spent a good deal of his leisure time in
Kentucky. Viewing the factual setting of the Foster case the immediate reaction is to categorize it as a rather clear Kentucky case.
From a territorialist point of view, Kentucky facts dominate the
case. It should be noted that what I am advocating is an overall territorial view of the case rather than a focus on the locus of the accident. Territorial thinking has suffered in the past from a heavy
emphasis on isolated events rather than an evaluation of the overall
factual pattern. By and large juridical events tend to be rather
heavily centered in one jurisdiction or another. This is true in the
vast majority of conflicts cases. The reason for this phenomenon is
that people tend to orient their lives towards central focal points.
Where the center of a juridical event is clearly defined in one jurisdiction then the law of that state ought generally to govern. This is
not the territorialism of the First Restatement which seeks out a
locus of a particular event. It is the "enlightened territorialism" of
such foes of the First Restatement as Professor David Cavers 87 and
the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
The disturbing feature of the Fuld rules is the return to an isolated event as a crucial factor in deciding choice-of-law cases. In
Foster the second Fuld rule chooses the law of Ohio because the defendant was domiciled in Ohio and the accident happened there.
This result occurred in spite of the very clear territorial preponderance of the case towards Kentucky. This illogic is heightened by
the very sharp difference between the first Fuld rule, which pays
little attention to the territorial aspects of the case but rather is interest analysis oriented, and the second Fuld rule. It is quite a feat
to put First Restatement principles and pure interest analysis together in one set of rules but that seems to have materialized in
Neumeier.
III.

CHOICE-OF-LAW-RULES OR APPROACH-A SUGGESTED ANSWER

The academic and judicial critics of ad hoc interest analysis have
raised a problem of considerable moment. They argue with vigor
37. See Cavers, supra note 9, at 139-203.
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that it is wrong for every choice of law case to have to wind its way
to the court of last resort in every state. 8 Since evaluating the interests is such a difficult and highly subjective process they contend
that the courts should develop well defined and narrow rules to deal
with recognizable categories of cases. If now and then the rules work
an injustice, it is a necessary price to pay for the certainty and predictability of a rule.
Having attacked the Fuld rules as being philosophically unsound
it seems only right to suggest an alternative to ad hoc decisionmaking in choice-of-law. Before making that venture I should like
to suggest why it was that the courts found ad hoc interest analysis
so ephemeral and unpredictable. Interest analysis as expounded by
the late Professor Currie and his disciples did not suffer from inexactness and unpredictability. That is a myth. The opposite is true.
In another forum I have examined the high degree of rigidity of the
pure interest analysts in their approach to conflicts cases.3 9 If indeed
courts are willing to read interests in the simplistic fashion that characterizes the works of the interesters there will be few cases to take
to the courts of appeal. One need only trot out the charts which the
interest theologians have developed and one will discover very
quickly whether one is faced with a true or false conflict. If one is
willing to go all the way with Currie then one need only determine
40
whether the forum has a legitimate interest and the game is over.
The problem, as I see it, is that courts have been unwilling to buy
the arguments of the pure interest analysts. For a brief, fleeting moment in time it seemed that Judge Keating in Tooker brought the
New York Court of Appeals to pure interest analysis. But it is now
evident that the court as a whole has decided against the pure interest analysis approach. If the court has turned its back on the pure,
pristine form of interest analysis it is not because of lack of predictability. It is rather because the courts did not like where pure interest analysis was taking them. The results dictated by interest analysis
were unacceptable.
The thesis just set forth is not a difficult one to prove. It is dear
88. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 6.
39. Twerski, supra note 14. See also Peterson, Developments in American Conflict
of Laws: Torts, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 289, 308 (1969).
40. B. CURwYE, NOTES ON MZMODS AND OBJECTI
IN THE CoNFurs OF LAws, in
SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF IAWS, 177, 184 (1968). Currie's position was that
if a state had a legitimate interest it must apply its own law. Although Professor

Currie later modified his position somewhat, see Currie, The Disinterested Third
State, 28 LAw & COtNr.M. PRtOB. 754, 757-58 (1963), and admitted that a state might
well interpret its own state interest in a "moderate or restrained" fashion, it is still
quite predictable how a Currie-type analysis will result.
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that the court was unwilling on the facts in Neumeier to apply any
law other than that of Ontario. It is also clear that pure interest
analysis did not give the court a solid theoretical framework to accomplish that result. It is clear that pure interest analysis would
lead the court to a result contrary to Rule Two. Yet, it is clear that
the court felt that when a defendant is acting solely within his home
state he should not be subjected to a standard of liability or recovery imposed by the plaintiff's state. Interest analysis would have
called that situation a true conflict and would find for the plaintiff
if the plaintiff were litigating in his home state.41 It is clear that the
court felt that when a plaintiff is injured in his home state the defendant who acted in the plaintiff's domicile should not be permitted
to raise the defense peculiar to his home state. Yet it is rather clear
that under the Currie variety of interest analysis, if the case were
litigated in the defendant's domicile, the court would be bound to
give him the benefit of that defense.4 2 The court in all these instances
was not opposed to the ad hoc nature of interest analysis. They were
opposed to the methodology that would have led them to a bad
result.
The obvious next question is: Why? For this author the reason
is rather elementary. The courts never have been willing to divest
themselves of the anti-territorial thinking that was required by interest analysis. 43 Thus, a very peculiar syndrome became evident.
Where the territorial considerations became substantial in any given
case the courts began inventing interests to support the results they
felt would be just." Thus pure interest analysis gave way to ad hoc
interest analysis. But, if what was behind the creation of ad hoc interest analysis was in truth territorial considerations, it was only a
matter of time before the truth would out. Neumeier v. Kuehner is
just such a case. The court acknowledged that the facts were Ontario oriented and applied Ontario law.
If one is willing to recognize a territorial bias, must one fashion
41. B. CuRuns, CONFLiCr, CRisis AND CoNFusioN IN NiW YORK, in SELGMW

ESSAY

ON THE CoNIcr OF LAWS 690, 705; Baade, Judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36
BROOKLYN L. REv. 10, 30 (1969).

42. Id.
43. Another leading conflicts court has indicated that it too is unwilling to dismiss
territorial considerations. In Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970),
the defendant driver was a resident of Delaware (host-guest state) who was driving the
Pennsylvania plaintiff back home to Pennsylvania (common-law state). The accident

occurred in Delaware. The majority, in finding that the Delaware host-guest statute
applied, relied heavily on Professor Cavers' territorially oriented principles of preference.
44. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), and
IntercontinentalPlanning Co. v. Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E2.d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d
817 (1969) are prime examples of this kind of interest manipulation.
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rules in order to gain predictability? Again, I emphasize that the territoriality advocated here is not that of the First Restatement. Rather
it is an attempt to view a juridical event in its total factual context
to locate the vortex of that event. Admittedly there may be close
cases that will be difficult of decision. But the vast majority of cases
will fall neatly in place. This approach to choice-of-law would not
be radically different from the methodology used by appellate courts
to deal with concepts such as proximate cause and the reasonable
man. To be sure, with all of these concepts there is a gray area that
causes some difficulty. But the core concept is both workable and
predictable. Taking the New York host-guest cases as examples, there
would be no difficulty under the proffered territorial analysis in predicting the application of New York law in Babcock v. Jackson45
and Macey v. Rozbicki.46 The host-guest rule would have clearly
been applied in Tooker v. Lopez4 7 Dym v. Gordon,48 Kell v. Henderson,49 and Neumeier v. Kuehner.5 0
What role will interests play in this choice of law process? It
will depend on whether the given policy at issue is so clear and unmistakable that the court feels comfortable with negating territorial
considerations in favor of the interests. By and large courts have felt
uncomfortable with negating important territorial considerations. 51
The time has come to make peace with reality. For this author the
turn to territorial considerations is a welcome development. But
45. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1963).

46. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966). Utilizing a general
territorial analysis rather than a lex loci approach it would be evident that New York
law should apply. All parties were New York domiciliaries who lived in the same city,
Buffalo, N.Y. Plaintiff was a sister of the defendant driver and came to Ontario for a
short summer vacation with the defendant at her summer cottage. The center of the
relationship between the parties was dearly New York. Professor Rosenberg has
correctly criticized the "seat of the relationship" test as unworkable in the Macey
setting. Rosenberg, supra note 18. Unlike the "seat of the relationship" test this author
is suggesting a general territorial orientation to choice of law. This would permit
the courts to evaluate all the factual contacts and also assess the interests. Where the
two reinforce each other it makes the outcome of the case all the easier to predict.
47. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 NE.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
48. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
49. 26 App. Div.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dept. 1966).
50. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
51. After considerable soul searching even Professor Cavers was forced to conclude
that his territorial principles of preference were not only tools for the resolution of
true conflicts but helped determine whether a conflict is false or avoidable. Cavers,
supra note 24, at 221. Although Professor Cavers was discussing his third principle of
preference I have suggested that his analysis and support of Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d
120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) in CAvEns, THE CHOICE OF LAw PRoCEss,

Am xX (1964), is also dependent on his territorial principles rather than the
ephemeral interests suggested by the court in Dym. See Twerski, supra note 28, at 373,
380.
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even for those who disagree it should be clear that few courts have
been willing to buy pure interest analysis. To the degree that they
have temporized with territorial considerations and masked them
in interest language the cases have lacked both coherence and a
persuasive quality. If enlightened territorialism is to carry the day
then Neumeier v. Kuehner may indeed be the seminal conflicts case

of the seventies. But it will take a clearer and more definitive statement by the courts that they are in fact taking territorial considerations seriously. When they do this they will have to evaluate their
past work product and face up to the fact that in the process of
developing the new choice-of-law methodology, decisions were made
2
that cannot be reconciled in spirit with their new found theory5
This task is now before the New York Court of Appeals. The rules
and the theory have yet to mesh. A challenging decade lies ahead5a
52. It is already dear that the New York Court of Appeals will have difficulty
reconciling Neumeier with Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d
734 (1968). In Miller, a resident of New York embarked on a short business trip to
Brunswick, Maine, where his brother resided and where they had mutual business
interests. Two days after his arrival he went for a ride in a car owned by his sisterin-law and driven by his brother. Mr. Miller was killed when the vehicle suddenly
swerved off the road and crashed into a bridge railing. Some three months after the
accident the decedent's brother and sister-in-law, who had been Maine residents,
returned to reside in New York. The defendants raised as a partial defense the
$20,000 wrongful death limitation in effect in Maine at the time of the accident.
New York law permitted unlimited liability in wrongful death cases.
The Court of Appeals, indulging in pure interest analysis, applied New York law.
Following the pattern set forth by Chief Judge Fuld in Rule Two, it would be only
logical to conclude that a defendant acting within his home state is protected by
the home state's law. The only possible distinction that could be made is that the court
did pay considerable attention to the post-transaction change in domicile of the
defendant. It is, however, hard to believe that the court decided the case in favor of
the New York plaintiff based on that ground alone. See Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts, 57 IowA L. REv. 1219, 1229
(1972).
53. On February 13, 1973 the Second Circuit decided Rosenthal v. Warren, 169
N.Y.L.J. 40, p. 1, col. 7 (Feb. 28, 1973). A New York physician, Dr. Rosenthal, went to
Boston to be treated by Dr. Warren. Following surgery Dr. Rosenthal died. A wrongful
death action alleging malpractice was brought against Dr. Warren. Under New York
law plaintiff would be entitled to unlimited recovery. Massachusetts law permitted a
maximum of $50,000. The issue is whether New York would apply its own law based
on nothing more than the fact that the plaintiff (decedent) was a New York resident.
The majority found that New York would apply its own law. What is crucial is the gross
misreading of Neumeier. The court differentiated Neumeier on the grounds that in
Neumeier the court made a strong point of the fact that New York had no interest
since the plaintiff was an Ontario resident. The Second Circuit paid no attention
whatsoever to the second Fuld rule: that a defendant acting solely within his home
state should not be subjected to liability if that state does not cast him in liability
simply because the victim's state provides for liability. This is the very situation
involved in Rosenthal. It is disturbing that the Second Circuit failed to discover the
significant shift in theory that Neumeier portends. If Neumeier indeed has shifted
choice of law theory the New York court will have to set it forth with greater clarity.
Otherwise we are destined to face meaningless distinction after distinction with rules
and theory opposing each other and competing for supremacy.

